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This volume contains essays on the most representative logicians of the period cov-
ered by the book (1685-1900) such as Leibniz, Bolzano, Schröder, Peirce or Frege, but 
also on philosophers such as Kant, Hegel or Husserl, whose reflections on logic have 
had a considerable influence on the development of this discipline. We begin with 
some general remarks on the structure and aims of the book and leave the commenta-
ries about some of the papers contained in it for the end of this review. 
 As it is said in the Preface, “what is striking about this period is the earliness and 
persistence of what could be called “the mathematical turn in logic”” (p. vii). Even 
though, the Editors remind us, this mathematical turn took different forms (at least in 
the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century): 
algebraic presentation of the laws and inferences of logic (algebraist approach) and foun-
dation of mathematics from the concepts and rules of inference of logic (logicist ap-
proach). But there was indeed a third way of understanding the link between logic and 
mathematics: that which understood logic as an aid for the formalization of mathe-
matical theories and proceeded later to the mathematical study of logic as a branch of 
mathematics (formalist approach). This was the way in which Peano, Hilbert and their re-
spective schools understood the relationship between logic and mathematics. This ap-
proach is, from our standpoint, “the precursor of the modern view that […] logic is 
indeed a branch of pure mathematics” (p. vii), which the Editors endorse to the alge-
braist approach. Unfortunately, there is no chapter in the book dedicated to the con-
tributions of Peano and his school to the rise of modern logic (Hilbert’s contributions 
are dealt with in volume 5 of the Handbook, untitled Logic from Russell to Church, which 
has just come out). This is quite misleading not only because Peano constitutes in 
many respects the link between the algebraic and logicist traditions, but also due to the 
fact that one of the most repeated thesis of the book is that “at the beginning of the 
twenty-century the algebra of logic was superseded by the mathematical logic of G. 
Frege (1848-1925) and G. Peano (1858-1932)” (p. 389). Indeed, without a close study 
of these two authors and of how Russell’s logic incorporated and transformed the her-
itage of Peano (symbolic logic) and Frege (logical analysis), no one can grasp the tran-
sition from nineteenth to twentieth century and the rise of modern mathematical log-
ic. 
 In accordance with the views expressed by the Editors, the main bulk of the pages 
concerning the logicians of the second half of the nineteenth century deals with the 
algebraic and mathematical logicians (to use Grattan-Guinness’ expression), but with a 
considerable disproportion: 334 pages dedicated to the algebraic logicians versus 91 
pages to the mathematical logicians. One of the reasons for this disproportion is ob-
viously that Frege is the only author considered on the side of mathematical logicians. 
But another reason is that some of the papers devoted to the algebraic logicians are 
concerned more or less with the same subjects. This is the case, for example, of Th. 
Hailperin’s paper and V. Sánchez Valencia’s one, which deal both with almost the 
BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Theoria 64 (2009): 115-122 
116
same authors (Boole, British logicians and algebraists, De Morgan, Peirce, Schröder, 
etc.) and topics (logic of classes, logic of relations and propositional logic). It would 
surely be better to have just one introduction to the development of the algebraic tra-
dition and then essays for each of the most representative authors of this tradition: 
Boole and his successors (Jevons and Venn), Peirce and Schröder. 
 Despite all that has been said in the last two paragraphs, the Editors have suc-
ceeded in assembling an extraordinary collection of papers and the book itself is a 
must-have for all graduate students and researchers interested in the history of logic. We 
proceed now to briefly review some of the papers included in the book, concentrating 
ourselves on the articles about the algebraic logicians cited before. 
 Th. Hailperin’s article Algebraical Logic 1685-1900 is a comprehensive study on the 
development of algebraic logic from Leibniz to Peirce and Schröder. Obviously, the 
sections on Boole are excellent (the author is one of the most authoritative of Boole’s 
scholars) and, generally speaking, the expositions are very clear and vigorous, even 
though they are often too schematic and sometimes incomplete. In section 7, for ex-
ample, the author explains “How the logic of relations began”. He focuses on De 
Morgan’s well known contributions to the topic and on Peirce’s first attempt to build 
an “algebra for the logic of relatives” in his “Notation for the Logic of Relatives” 
(Peirce, 1870). But there is not a section for explaining “the development of the logic 
of relations” in the hands of Peirce and Schröder (even though we can find it in the 
next paper by V. Sánchez Valencia). Nor can we find any mention of Schröder in sec-
tion 9, dedicated to “Propositional Logic” (although the author devoted the second 
volume of his monumental Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (Schröder, 1891) to the 
topic), but we find an unexpected subsection on Frege’s propositional logic (recall this 
is a chapter on Algebraical Logic and we have a later chapter on Frege). Moreover, the 
subsection on Peirce’s propositional logic focuses only on Peirce’s article “On the Al-
gebra of Logic” (Peirce, 1880), but there is no mention of the paper “On the Algebra 
of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation” (Peirce, 1885), surely the 
most outstanding work (with Frege’s Begriffschrift) of the nineteenth century for his 
contributions to propositional and quantificational logic (the author refers only to this 
article when talking about truth values). Fortunately, we have an adequate review of it 
in Risto Hilpinen’s essay (to be reviewed later). 
 The essay The Algebra of Logic by V. Sánchez Valencia is a lengthy study on the de-
velopment of the algebraist tradition in logic. As the author remarks the four main ac-
tors in this development are Boole, De Morgan, Peirce and Schröder, even the focus 
of his concern is the work of Boole and De Morgan. In Part 1, the author analyzes the 
mathematical background that influenced De Morgan and Boole (for example: lagran-
gian algebras, symbolical algebra or Hamilton’s logic), but it must be said that very lit-
tle is said about the way in which this influence took course. In Parts 2-5, the author 
explains the “logic of monadic predicates” (or “absolute terms”) of Boole, Jevons, 
Peirce and Schröder respectively. Finally, in Parts 6-8, the author’s concern is the “log-
ic of relations” of De Morgan, Peirce and Schröder. The analysis of Boole’s logic is 
quite interesting, but the methodological perspective adopted is quite disputable. Basi-
cally, what the author tries to do is to present a Reconstructed Boole’s Logic (his own 
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words) in terms of modern logic. For example, some of the entries in the sections on 
Boole’s logic are The vocabulary, Construction rules, Derivations, Derived rules (where he 
mentions Boole’s Cut Rule), etc. Obviously, Boole neither used this terminology, nor 
conceived his logic in terms of these notions, simply because they were not at his dis-
posal. So there is a serious danger of misunderstanding the way in which Boole un-
derstood his calculus of logic using all this conceptual machinery. 
 On the contrary, the analysis of Peirce’s contributions to the algebra of logic is bas-
ically chronological and it goes directly to the heart of the matter: the development of 
quantificational logic from the algebra of logic. Nevertheless, there are some points to 
dispute. For example, the author says (p. 462) that Peirce’s “treatment of absolute 
terms in (Peirce, 1870) is essentially quantificational” and that despite the fact that “in 
his initial papers Peirce lacks a notation for quantifiers […] he had very early the no-
tion of quantification”. It is true that in (Peirce, 1870) the author tried to express 
quantified statements (particularly, the existential ones), as Sanchez Valencia correctly 
argues in pages 469-470, but this doesn’t imply necessarily that by this time Peirce had 
the notion (even implicit) of quantification. In the last part of his essay, the author 
pays attention to “the way in which Schröder developed Peirce’s theory of quantifica-
tion and to his formalization of the algebra of relations” (p. 531). The conclusion of 
the author is that “against current wisdom, illustrated for instance in (Goldfarb, 1979, 
252), we have to conclude that to arrive at a calculus of relations […] was not the only 
aim of Schröder’s third volume. He engaged as well in the development of the theory 
of quantification as the proof theoretical framework in which to carry proofs, as the 
semantic framework in which meaning could be captured” (p. 536). This is very re-
markable because, as we will explain immediately, Goldfarb’s thesis is part and parcel 
of a much extended misunderstanding about Schröder’s theory of quantification 
which makes a correct account of his contribution to the rise and development of 
modern logic impossible. 
 V. Peckhaus’ paper on Schröder’s Logic is an excellent introduction to Schröder’s life 
and work in logic: its sources, the aim of this work, the problems handled, etc. In the 
first section, the author makes an introduction to the significance of Schröder ap-
proach to logic and a re-evaluation of the place deserved to Schröder in the historio-
graphy of logic (and this is, from our standpoint, completely necessary). In the next 
four sections, the author makes an overview to Schröder’s life and writings in logic, 
his algebraic programme and the sources of his work. The rest of the sections are de-
voted to Schröder’s algebra of logic: Schröder’s calculus of domains and classes and 
his calculus of propositions, Schröder’s method of resolution of logical problems, the 
quasi-axiomatic presentation of his logic and, finally, Schröder’s logic of relatives and 
its relationship with his pasigraphic project (with a comparison with Leibniz’ and 
Frege’s one). Like Sánchez Valencia, the author recognizes that Schröder developed a 
“full- fledged theory of quantification” (p. 557), but he remarks later that “for 
Schröder the use of ∑  and ∏  in logic is perfectly analogous to arithmetic. The exis-
tential quantifier and the universal quantifier are therefore interpreted as possible inde-
finite logical addition or disjunction, and logical multiplication or conjunction, respec-
tively” (p. 576). 
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 Peckhaus’ emphasis on this interpretation belongs also to the “current wisdom” 
mentioned before, which includes not only (Goldfarb, 1979, 354), but also (Moore, 
1980, 98), (Grattan-Guinness, 1997, 20), (Brady, 2000, 149), etc. Nonetheless, this cur-
rent wisdom ought to be seriously qualified: In explaining the meaning of his fifteenth 
postulate [Festsetzung] for the algebra of relatives, Schröder defines semantically the 
quantifiers’ symbols. For example, he says about the universal quantified statement 
∏ u
u
A  that it “means that the statement uA  is true for each one of these objects u […] 
Therefore, the statement ∏ u
u
A  will have the truth value 1 when and only when, for 
any u considered, = 1uA ” (Schröder, 1895a, 36-37). This definition of the quantifiers 
is completely analogous to the one he has given previously in (Schröder, 1891) and to 
the one given by Peirce in (Peirce, 1885). From this definition, Schröder offers a justi-
fication of the schemes [Schemata] or principles [Prinzipien] which regulate the use of 
the universal and existential quantifiers in the algebra of relatives. Only later, when he 
introduces a new list of auxiliary schemas, which express some rules relative to what 
nowadays is called multiple quantification, Schröder proposes for its justification “taking 
in consideration mainly (but this is not indispensable and talking strictly ought to be 
avoided), for didactical reasons, the usual expression of ∏  and ∑  as [if they were] a 
“explicit” product or aggregate of a multiplicity of terms” (Ibid., 111). We have to con-
clude then that the interpretation of the existential quantifier and the universal quan-
tifier in terms of possible indefinite logical conjunction or disjunction is not the only 
one (and surely not the main one) and that the emphasis on this interpretation, “cur-
rent wisdom” in the historiography on Schröder’s logic, is a serious obstacle for inter-
preting and evaluating correctly Schröder’s contributions to modern quantificational 
logic. (It is not unthinkable to assume that Peirce was aware of the use of the quantifi-
ers in the semantical sense explained before and that for this reason he claims in his 
review of (Schröder, 1895a) that Schröder “often” uses his “general algebra of logic” 
(the term by which Peirce refers to his own quantificational logic) in the development 
of the algebra of relatives (Peirce, 1933, 282)). 
 R. Hilpinen’s Peirce’s Logic is just the essay which anyone who would like to intro-
duce himself to the study of Peirce’s logic must read, for it deals with all the topics re-
levant to the correct understanding of the multiple-faced logic of Ch. S. Peirce. In the 
introductory first section, the author states explicitly that “the emergence of formal or 
mathematical logic in the 19th and the early 20th century was the outcome of two paral-
lel and partly independent lines of development, whose key figures were Charles S. 
Peirce and Gottlob Frege” (p. 611). The prominence of Peirce and Frege is due to the 
fact that they “were the first logicians who construed quantifiers as variable binding 
operators. They invented quantification theory independently of each other, at ap-
proximately the same time” (p. 612). Peirce’s development of quantification theory 
from his logic of relatives is precisely the topic of section 2, which also deals with 
Peirce’s axiomatization and truth value analysis of propositional logic. The following 
sections are on Peirce’s logic in the context of his semiotics and pragmatism (where 
the author points out Peirce’s interpretation of quantifiers in terms of games with per-
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fect information), Peirce’s existential graphs, Peirce on modalities and possible words 
(where the author explains his modal interpretation of conditional statements), 
Peirce’s contributions to three valued logic and, finally, Peirce’s theory of reasoning 
(with emphasis on his analysis of non-deductive argumentation, i.e., induction and ab-
duction). Indeed, Hilpinen’s essay helps to clarify or complete some important aspects 
relative to the development of Peirce’s logic touched on in previous essays, even 
though his explanations are sometimes insufficient. For example, the author correctly 
observes that “the main purpose of his [Peirce’s] logical work is the analysis of logical 
inference rather than practical facilitation of reasoning” (p. 612). This, we must re-
mark, is the reason he replaced the sign of identity by the sign  to represent the co-
pula, but nor Hilpinen’s neither Hailperin’s or Sánchez Valencia’s essays make any ref-
erence to this important question. Analogously, in explaining the development of 
quantification theory from his algebra of relatives, the author just says that “the defini-
tion of relative product and sum requires a quantifier” (p. 614). This is obviously true, 
but it doesn’t explain for itself the transition from the algebra of relatives to the general 
algebra of logic (Peirce’s quantificational logic). The reasons are by far more complex and 
it must be said again that not one of the authors reviewed tries to explain them.  
 I. Grattan-Guinness’ The Mathematical Turns in Logic is a short paper on the interplay 
between, on one side, logic and mathematics and, on the other, algebraic and mathe-
matical logic. He mentions four main differences between the two traditions of sym-
bolic logic: part-whole theory versus set theory (Russell), laws and properties versus 
axioms, mathematics applied to logic versus logic applied to mathematics and, finally, 
attention upon adjectives and names versus attention upon the quantitative expres-
sions “all, every, any, a, some and the” (Russell again). Obviously, each of these heads 
would deserve a long commentary which probably would exceed the aim of this re-
view. It is not clear if the author thinks of these differences between the two traditions 
as the reasons  the algebraic tradition was superseded by the mathematical one. Never-
theless they were probably only different aspects of the main reason that algebraic log-
ic was partially abandoned at the beginning of the twentieth century, i.e., “the fact that 
the algebra of logic became to be regarded as not suitable for the new research goal, 
the logical foundations of the whole of mathematics” (p. 390)1. 
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1 G. H. Moore’s and I. Grattan-Guinness’ papers cited above are respectively: “Beyond First-Order Log-
ic: The Historical Interplay between Mathematical Logic and Axiomatic Set Theory”, History and Phi-
losophy of Logic (1), pp. 95-137 and “Vida en común, vidas separadas. Sobre las interacciones entre ma-
temáticas y lógicas desde la Revolución Francesa hasta la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Theoria (12), pp. 
13-37. For the rest of the references see the bibliography available in V. Peckhaus’ paper in the book 
reviewed.  
 
